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The Origin (and Future) of Transpersonal Psychology
in an Open Scientific Naturalism
(Introduction to the Special Topic Section)
Glenn Hartelius

Editor-in-Chief
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
A number of scholars well known within transpersonal psychology appear to be
converging on open scientific naturalism as a philosophically and methodologically
fruitful framework for transpersonal and related fields. This builds on the nascent open
naturalism evidenced in the early years of transpersonal psychology, before it entered
its metaphysical phase (ca. 1975 to 2000). Since it is necessary for science to assume
some kind of world within which it is possible to do science, and not every aspect of
that assumed world can be subjected to processes of empirical investigation, some of
these necessary background assumptions are unavoidably metaphysical. However, the
fact that these are unavoidable does not justify the insertion of foreground metaphysical
explanations for psychological or spiritual phenomena. Rather than attempting to
broaden psychology by adding metaphysics, an open scientific naturalism can make it
more inclusive and more scientific by disputing metaphysically based disbeliefs based
on specifically Western background reality assumptions.
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don’t remember taking my first steps, but they
were surely as ungraceful and short-lived as
those of most toddlers. Learning is a messy
process marked more by setbacks, defeats,
and half-victories than outright successes. The
growth of science is no different, and selective
“histories” of the discipline apply a veneer of
unbroken progress to what has been a shuffling
emergence littered with false starts and failures
(cf. Singham, 2019). Though mature in some
technologies, human societies still wobble on
unsure legs toward a precarious future. It should be
no surprise, then, that the philosophical foundations
informing scientific culture likely require some
revision since their inception in the 17th century.
Complaints abound about how covert
Western ideological strictures narrow the study
of psychology; the transpersonal field is rife with
critiques of how these foundations impose biases into
what should be more impartial scientific processes
(e.g., Hartelius, 2019). There is unquestionably
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urgent need for revision of some deeply rooted
yet extra-scientific assumptions about the nature
of reality. But notwithstanding idealistic manifestos
(e.g., Beauregard et al., 2014; Cardeña, 2014) and
optimistic predictions for change (e.g., Tart, 2009),
it will take years of concerted effort, a good deal
of patiently gathered evidence, and the luck of
favorable winds in culture for lasting change to
come. When that step forward does come, it will
likely be preferable to what came before, even if
similarly incomplete and imperfect.
This leaves transpersonal psychology in the
awkward position of needing to buck against implicit
assumptions within current science and psychology
in order to study phenomena and constructs central
to its topic area. The challenge has led some within
the transpersonal field to advocate for the inclusion
of metaphysical explanations of mystical, spiritual,
and exceptional human experience, arguing that
since metaphysical assumptions are inescapable
they should instead be embraced (e.g., Cunningham,
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2019a, 2019b; Taylor, 2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2022) as
part of a post-materialist stance that can support a
shift away from the harmful impacts of materialism
(Taylor, 2017b). In doing so, it is claimed, transpersonal
psychology would be aligning with its traditional
metaphysical orientation (Taylor, 2022; cf. summary
in Daniels, 2022). However, this approach mistakenly
conflates two different categories of metaphysics,
misinterprets post-materialism, and misrepresents
the relationship of transpersonal psychology to
metaphysics in its early years. A more pragmatic,
more scientific, and in fact more common response
within transpersonal psychology is to instead apply
an open naturalism that is less encumbered by
specifically Western reality assumptions that have
permeated some of scientific culture.
Transpersonal Psychology’s First Orientation
Was an Open Scientific Naturalism
t least two of the key founders of transpersonal
psychology—Abraham Maslow and Anthony
Sutich—pursued a nascent version of something
much closer to science based in an open naturalism.
Maslow, transpersonal psychology’s most prominent
founder and the one who lent his considerable
credibility to its conception, was an empirical
researcher in primate behavior (e.g., Maslow, 1936,
1940; Harlow et al., 1932) who shifted to the study
of human motivation. Yet Maslow combined his
rigorous science with a naturalism that was unusually
open and discerning. For example, he argued that
the version of objectivity typically used in science
was not sufficiently impartial because it was driven
by utilitarian human priorities (Maslow, 1964/1970);
he argued that an appreciative objectivity that
sought to understand natural phenomena on their
own terms would be more effective. Given his more
flexible stance it may be tempting to imagine that
Maslow’s openness extended beyond the boundaries
of science, and to read metaphysics into some of
his writings, such as his 1969(a) paper, “Various
Meanings of Transcendence.” However, careful
examination will show that even his categories in this
paper such as “transcendence of time” (p. 56) and
“transcendence of space” (p. 63) refer to qualities
of phenomenological experience, not elevation into
some hidden dimension of reality.

Likewise, Anthony Sutich, founding editor
of The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology (JTP),
wrote the journal’s Statement of Purpose in a way that
specifically emphasized the role of empirical research
(Hartelius, 2021; Lajoie et al., 1991): he indicated that
this new transpersonal journal was “concerned with the
publication of theoretical and applied research, original
contributions, empirical papers, articles, and studies” in
subjects of interest to the transpersonal field (Lajoie et
al., 1991, pp. 175–176, emphasis in original). Worthy
of particular note is the one key difference from the
Statement of Purpose that Sutich had written eight years
earlier for the Journal of Humanistic Psychology (JHP) in
1961, which he also founded: that journal he described
as “concerned with the publication of theoretical and
applied research, original contributions, papers, articles,
and studies,” without specific reference to empirical
work (Sutich, 1969, p. 12). His statement for the
transpersonal journal, then, added specific reference to
“empirical” papers, and placed the term in italics.
This same attitude can be seen in the earliest
inspiration for the founding of the transpersonal field.
Anthony Sutich (1976), in the text of his dissertation
describing the founding of the transpersonal field,
reported that an interest in mystical experience was
awakened in him at a 1966 Humanistic Theology
seminar at Esalen Instutute. He then realized that his
actual interest was "in the psychology of mysticism,
modified by humanistic considerations and the
Western attitude of empiricism" (p. 8). In June of 1967,
Maslow sent Sutich a lengthy manuscript which he
considered "'the culmination of 30 years of work in
psychology'" (p. 11)—a paper titled, "A Theory of
Metamotivation: The Biological Rooting of the ValueLife" (Maslow, 1967). It was in response to this Maslow
paper that Sutich (1976) would formulate his first draft
of the Statement of Purpose for what would become
The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology (p. 13). Amid
their enthusiasm, the emphasis on empirical research
of human phenomena that are biologically based
is unmistakeable. It is hard to imagine that Maslow
or Sutich were relishing the opportunity to reduce
mysticism and human values to some narrow version
of materialism—which would hardly be a novel or
inspiring contribution. It seems rather more likely that
their enthusiasm for this enterprise was awakened by
the prospect of using empirical methods to demonstrate
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that self-centered survival did not drive all animal
behavior, and the inherent potentials of biologically
rooted human nature went well beyond what Western
psychology had previously allowed (cf. Grogan, 2008;
Vailunas, 2011).
This view appears to be specifically confirmed
by Maslow in the preface to his 1962 edition of Toward
a Psychology of Being, in which he equated his notion
of self-actualization with both psychological health and
full-humanness, describing these as "the development
of the biologically based nature of man, [that] therefore
is (empirically) normative for the whole species rather
than for particular times and places" (p. iii). Maslow
sought to ground the commonalities of human nature's
"farther reaches" (1969a)—its tendencies toward
altruism, autonomy, and selfless dedication, and the
peak experiences that at times accompanied these
aspirations—in the soil of shared human biology rather
than in lofty metaphysical visions (Maslow, 1962). He
argued that the striving for these was no less biologically
founded, no less necessary for survival, than the drive
toward selfishness—and that his claims in this regard
were empirically based.
However, with the passing of Maslow and
Sutich—in 1970 and 1976 respectively—the field
departed sharply from this early vision of an exploratory open naturalism. It shifted from a field with
scientific interest in experiences often associated with
metaphysical explanations, to the direct embrace
of those metaphysical explanations. In doing so, it
became something quite different than what Maslow
and Sutich had founded, and placed itself at some
remove from the discipline of psychology.
What should be plainly acknowledged here is
that from its early years there has been a divide between
those in the field who followed in the fledgling open
scientific naturalism of Maslow and Sutich, and those
who preferred to ground the field more explicitly in
syncretic metaphysical schemas such as Ken Wilber’s.
Begining around 1975, it was proponents of syncretic
metaphysics who came to hold sway. With behindthe-scenes support from the new JTP editor, Miles Vich
(cf. Ferrer & Puente, 2013), Wilber’s metaphysically
based neo-perennialist spiritual framework (cf. Ferrer,
2002; Hanegraaff, 1996; Hartelius, 2017a) became the
de facto philosophical foundation of transpersonal
psychology (cf. Rothberg, 1986).

52

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

The preeminence of metaphysics in the
field came to an end in the early 2000s with several
events: Ken Wilber (2000) withdrew from the
transpersonal field, Jorge Ferrer (2002) articulated a
non-metaphysical framework for spiritual pluralism,
Harris Friedman (2002) formally called for
transpersonal psychology to function as a science,
and the International Journal of Transpersonal
Studies (IJTS) transferred to the editorship of
Harris Friedman and Douglas MacDonald (2003).
Friedman (1983) had previously created the first
explicitly transpersonal measure and applied it in
ways that clearly illustrated how a version of open
naturalism could function within transpersonal
psychology in the conduct of systematic empirical
research (Friedman, 2018b, 2021). These events set
the stage for reemergence of the field’s early forays
into a science-based open naturalism.
Due to the predominant influence of
syncretic metaphysics from roughly 1975 to 2000, it
might appear that the field has been unambiguously
associated with metaphysical leanings since its
inception. But there are few grounds for such
an interpretation. In its early years the field was
feeling its way forward into unknown territory, with
an open-ended and exploratory mix of papers.
Considering those papers that engaged with the
topic of metaphysics as more than a passing mention
during Sutich’s editorship (1969–1975), it is possible
to recognize both an incipient open naturalism, and
an active interest in metaphysics. However, there
is no indication of a framework for psychology
grounded in syncretic metaphysics prior to Wilber’s
1975 paper, “Psychologia Perennis: The Spectrum
of Consciousness.”
For those interested in a detailed review
of the topic of metaphysics in early transpersonal
journal papers (other readers may skip this
paragraph and the next), papers discussing the
topic of metaphysics published from 1969 through
1971 included a Maslow (1969b) reference to
background reality assumptions, two papers
attempting comparisons between metaphysics
and new areas of physics (Green & Green, 1971;
LeShan, 1969), and a paper by Pahnke and Richards
(1969) suggesting that LSD’s effects made mystical
experiences available to experimental conditions.
Hartelius

Two additional papers related to the latter topic,
but not making specific mention of metaphysics,
attempted a biological interpretation of mystical
union (Maven, 1969), and comparisons between
mysticism and schizophrenia (Wapnick, 1969).
One paper mentioned metaphysics in the context
of a Western encounter with the spirituality of Zen
Buddhism (Hart, 1970). The closest approach to
the approval of metaphysics within science came
from Harman (1969), who proposed that in a new
science, metaphors from religious or metaphysical
systems might be more appropriate relative to certain
areas of human experience than their rather barren
scientific counterparts. But there is no indication of
movement toward a metaphysical foundation for
psychology, or even for psychological constructs.
One account in this earlier period reported
on a person who claimed to have experienced a
metaphysical truth directly while under the influence
of LSD. This possibility was subsequently amplified
by Grof (1972, 1973), who described LSD experiences
of patients in terms hinting that some of these might
represent recall or perception that was in veridical
in some sense other than constructions related to
physiological or psychological processes. Two other
brief mentions of metaphysics were not of new
significance (Bernbaum, 1974; Watts, 1974). It is in
the context of these early curiosities about mystical
and spiritual human potentials that Wilber published
his 1975 paper proposing a syncretic metaphysical
framework for grounding both psychology and
spirituality—a concept that was novel to psychology in
its approach as well as its specific content. That this
was a new and original combination is reflected in
Hanegraaff’s (1996) characterization of Wilber’s work
as formative within the category of New Age religion.
The years when JTP was under Sutich’s
editorship suggest that early transpersonal scholars
were interested to know how much of what was
traditionally languaged in mystical or metaphysical
terms might eventually be grounded in scientific
evidence. But it should be clear from this brief review
that metaphysics was not at all the field’s “traditional
association” during this early period. For promoters
of metaphysics in psychology, it would likely be
overly optimistic to read the field’s subsequent 25year metaphysical phase back into these first years.
Transpersonal Psychology    and Open Scientific Naturalism

Metaphysics Are Only Unavoidable
In Background Reality Assumptions
hile it is not possible to avoid some form of
metaphysics as a backdrop even for science,
proponents of metaphysical explanations make
rather too much of this fact. What is lacking is a
distinction between background reality assumptions
and foreground explanations. Roy Bhaskar (1975/
1997) wisely noted that “every account of science
presupposes an ontology [in the sense that] it
presupposes a schematic answer to the question
of what the world must be like for science to be
possible” (p. 59). Only some of these essential
assumptions will be empirically demonstrable.
However, this inescapable limitation of background
reality assumptions cannot be legitimately used to
justify the construction of metaphysical foreground
explanations of specific phenomena.
Yet this is precisely the strategy employed by
Steve Taylor and Paul Cunningham in their advocacy
for metaphysics in transpersonal psychology.
Taylor has repeatedly pointed to the necessity of
background reality assumptions, and used this fact to
justify his own foreground metaphysical explanations
of specific psychological phenomena; for example,
in his 2017(b) paper that encouraged a move beyond
materialism, Taylor rightly pointed out that in science
“some form of metaphysical paradigm will always be
in the background” (p. 148); this is the valid argument
for inescapable background assumptions. He
proceeded to identify some of the deleterious effects
that accrue when these background assumptions are
of the sort prevalent in Western culture—to which
he has applied the term “materialism.” Other than
pointing out that materialism is a general term that
applies to many more things than Taylor means, he
will have no complaint from me on this.
But then Taylor (2017b, 2022) argued
for replacement of this materialism with a postmaterialist vision that, conveniently, would sanction
his metaphysically based foreground explanation that
an all-pervasive spiritual force is the source for his
own spiritual experiences as well as those of peoples
from all other spiritual traditions and orientations
(Taylor, 2016). This conclusion simply does not
follow, any more than flaws in the justice system can

W

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

53

be used to condone general lawlessness. In addition,
it naïvely interprets phenomenal experiences in
peripersonal space as veridical events in Euclidean
space (cf. Barrett & Quigley, 2021; Hartelius, 2016a;
Hartelius et al., 2022). While one can grant Taylor’s
general claim that some form of metaphysics is
unavoidable, this fact does not justify the sort of
specific metaphysical explanations that Taylor (2016,
2017a, 2017b, 2022) has advanced. The difference
between indispensable reality assumptions and
optional metaphysical constructions is a bright and
clear line; it is not a distinction that “admits of degrees”
(Cunningham, 2019a) any more than paying taxes is
on some sort of blurry continuum with buying an ice
cream cone: both involve money, but the fact that
one is inevitable while the other is entirely optional
makes them discrete types of transaction.
A more complex version of this strategy has
been developed by Cunningham (2019a, 2019b),
which is problematic in such a variety of ways that a
thorough rebuttal would likely exhaust many readers.
Moreover, the effort would not be well spent given
that Cunningham's lengthy discourse accomplishes
little to nothing: all of the types of experience that
he or Taylor have interest in are already amenable to
empirical study under an open scientific naturalism, the
critiques of Western background reality assumptions
are already implied in such an open naturalism, and
none of the arguments they have put foward can
legitimize the incorporation of metaphysically based
foreground explanations in psychology.
The point of differentiation is that Cunningham and Taylor seem to believe that if empirical
evidence validates a given phenomenon, it also
validates an associated metaphysical interpretation
of that phenomenon. For example, Cunningham
(2019a) suggested that "a generalized empirical
method does not preclude the examination and
evaluation of metaphysical and 'supranatural' claims
... that are accompanied by psychological effects
and/or physical correlates" (p. 20). Cunningham's
assumption here is that physiological effects
interpreted as the impact of a metaphysical force
are evidence of that metaphysical force.
This parallels Taylor's (2017b) claim that
"there is no reason why transpersonal psychology
should exclude metaphysical claims, as long as they
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are inferred or implied by research and evidence"
(p. 16). Here again is the assumption that metaphysical
phenomena can be inferred from empirical results.
This is not the case. If there is direct evidence for some
phenomenon, then that phenomenon is no longer
metaphysical; if that demonstrated phenomenon is
believed to be the result of a metaphysical force,
that empirical evidence does not accrue to the
assumed metaphysical cause. To believe otherwise
is a common logical fallacy, known as affirming the
consequent. By way of illustration, falling prey to
this logical fallacy would mean that if I believe fire
hydrants are installed by aliens, then I would take
the presence of fire hydrants as proof that aliens
exist. This case for metaphysical explanations fails,
but that failure does not preclude careful scientific
research into valued experiential phenomena
that would ordinarily be dismissed based on the
metaphysics of Western reality assumptions.
To briefly consider several additional points
advanced by Cunningham (2019a), he has, contrary
to evidence, imputed to Hartelius and others such as
Daniels, Friedman, and MacDonald the position that
transpersonal psychology should “be an empirical
science like physics, chemistry, astronomy, and
biology” (p. 9), that these scholars are proponents
of “logical positivism” (p. 7) who hold the goal of
applying strictly those methods effective for the
study of “impersonal, inanimate objects” (p. 9)
to transpersonal phenomena. Cunningham has
then included “the phenomenal” (p. 10)—namely,
properties experienced in the mind—among
those “aspects of transpersonal phenomena that
are receptive to conventional research methods
associated with the physical sciences” (pp. 9–10).
These claims are problematic. For example,
the physical sciences are those that study non-living
systems, and unless I have missed recent research
on the lived experiences of igneous rock or carbon
dioxide, lumping phenomenology with methods
“associated with the physical sciences” (p. 10), or
with logical positivism, is simply wrong. Moreover,
Cunningham’s (2019a) imputation of such a radical
position to these authors is a demonstrably false
and gratuitously polemical charge that plays to the
justifiable anxieties of many with strong interest in
the transpersonal field. This sort of ill-considered
Hartelius

rhetoric serves to inflame unfounded fears that
inclusion of empirical research—and specifically
quantitative methods—will somehow result in
the reduction or dismissal of exactly the types of
exceptional experiences that are of interest in the
transpersonal field.
That Cunningham’s (2019a) claims are
entirely fictitious can be seen in examples of my work
published well before his jeremiad. I have pointed
out the value of first-person methods and the need
to consider the influence of state of consciousness
on every method of inquiry (Hartelius, 2007),
critiqued the apparent exclusion of the subject-ness
of the mind and the human-ness of the person within
some approaches to scientific psychology (Hartelius,
2014a), and pointed out the problematic nature of
“philosophical assumptions about the nature of mind
and matter and reality that preclude asking the sorts
of questions or designing the methods that might
lead to a more useful understanding of subtle and
exceptional experiences” (p. iv). My work has pointed
to the psychological importance of “flashes of insight,
moments of flow, of deep absorption, intuition, gut
instinct, spiritual and mystical encounters, tastes of
profound connection with the world, [and] empathic
bonds that open something far deeper than words”
(Hartelius, 2016b, p. iv); I have argued for novel
approaches to study the person as a living system
embedded in larger contexts, and complained that
the marginalization of rigorous parapsychological
research comes from evaluating these findings
based on Western philosophy’s conventional reality
models rather than on empirical evidence. I have also
proposed an approach to decreasing the influence of
metaphysical Western materialist reality assumptions
in science more broadly (Hartelius, 2019).
This small sampling of a repeated theme
in my writing, also evidenced in works by other of
the named scholars (e.g., Daniels, 2021; Friedman,
2021), shows a deep sympathy for what both
Cunningham (2019a) and Taylor (e.g., 2022) have
identified as a philosophically-rooted narrowness
in much of psychology. Despite dire forecasts by
Cunningham and Taylor, decades of productive
empirical work in both parapsychology (e.g.,
Cardeña, 2018) and transpersonal psychology
(Hartelius, 2021) have only sharpened awareness
Transpersonal Psychology    and Open Scientific Naturalism

of philosophical issues in psychology (Friedman,
2021; Hartelius, 2019) and stimulated development
of additional methodological tools (e.g., Hlava
et al., 2014; King & DeCicco, 2009; López et al.,
2017). My response has been to work with others
toward development of approaches and methods
designed to incrementally mitigate these problems
(e.g., Hartelius, 2007, 2015, 2019, 2020; Hartelius &
Ferrer, 2013; Hartelius et al., 2022), as a pragmatic
alternative to the uncritical embrace of metaphysical
explanations for psychological phenomena.
The present paper should put to rest
concerns that Friedman or myself reject inclusion
of any discussion of metaphysics (Cunningham,
2019a; Daniels, 2021; Taylor, 2022; cf. Friedman,
2021; Hartelius, 2019). There is agreement that
metaphysical background reality assumptions based
in Western culture should not impede the study
of valued human experiences and capacities, an
agreement that existed prior to these dialogues with
Taylor and Cunningham. The point of dissent centers
on use of foreground metaphysical explanations for
certain experiential phenomena, a remedy that is
incompatible with psychology, unnecessary for the
study of these phenomena, and would likely add little
more than slight variations to a replay of Wilber's
failed efforts to install nonessential metaphysical
constructions into the heart of psychology (Hartelius,
2017a).
Post-Materialism is not License
for Metaphysical Smuggling
nother argument advanced in Taylor’s (2017a,
2017b, 2022) case for inclusion of foreground
metaphysics favors some form of post-materialism,
bolstered by the promise that with commitment to
this type of orientation transpersonal psychology can
support a cultural shift away from the deleterious
effects of materialism. Again, the issue here is not
Taylor’s critique of the impact of a narrow Western
materialism; it is his relatively simplistic interpretation
of post-materialism, and his inadequate remedies
for what is a complex sociological, scientific,
and philosophical challenge. Taylor appears
to have interpreted post-materialism in a way
that permits the insertion of his own speculative
spiritual interpretations into psychology—what
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Daniels (2021) has aptly termed “metaphysical
smuggling.” Taylor's imaginative interpretation of
post-materialism is problematic.
Post-materialism began as a description
of a shift in societal values away from a focus on
material security and towards self-expression,
egalitarianism, and ecological concerns, first
popularized by Ronald Inglehart (1977/2015) in
his work, The Silent Revolution (cf. Inglehart,
1971). More recently, this term has been adopted
by some in fields such as psychology, spirituality,
consciousness, and parapsychology to label an
approach to science that aspires to overcome
philosophically rooted delimitations of science in
contemporary scientific culture (e.g., Beauregard
et al., 2014). In both usages, the shift is nuanced:
individuals with post-materialist values are "post" in
the sense that they aligned with a set of values that
has emerged in the wake of an earlier societal focus
on values aligned with wealth acquisition; these
are not reactionaries who have turned against all
material goods and who want to leave cities so as
to live off of the land as hunter-gatherers. Similarly,
post-materialist science is a vision for the kind of
science that simply comes after an earlier version
that has been artificially constrained by narrow
Western materialist assumptions about reality; it is
not a version of science that has turned against core
scientific principles in order to embrace foreground
metaphysical explanations.
A post-materialist science would not be
intent on adopting metaphysical explanations
for psychological phenomena, or any other
phenomena, because then it would no longer be
a science. That this is the case can be seen in the
manifesto for its creation that was endorsed by a
number of scholars who are well known within the
transpersonal field: “Science is first and foremost a
nondogmatic, open-minded method of acquiring
knowledge about nature through the observation,
experimental
investigation,
and
theoretical
explanation of phenomena” (Beauregard et al.,
2014); signers included Larry Dossey, Lisa Miller,
Rupert Sheldrake, Marilyn Schlitz, Gary Schwartz,
and Charles Tart. This manifesto is a call for a more
open-minded naturalism—which I argue should
include a critique of constraints imposed by culturally
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situated background reality assumptions. Nowhere
in this manifesto is there even a hint of advocacy
for the inclusion of foreground explanations that are
metaphysical in nature.
Such a position is consistent with Maslow’s
thought, and with open naturalism positions
held by Daniels (2021, 2022), Friedman (2015;
2021), Ferrer (2014)—notably the first to name
this formulation within the transpersonal field—
and myself (2019); it is also congruent with Etzel
Cardeña’s (2014) call for “an open, informed study
of all aspects of consciousness” (p. 1), a paper
signed by 100 scholars worldwide including many
who are familiar in transpersonal psychology: Daryl
Bem, Menas Kafatos, Dean Radin, Charles Tart,
Max Velmans, Julie Beischel, Allan Leslie Combs,
Arnaud Delorme, Harris Friedman, Bruce Greyson,
Jeffrey Kripal, Stanley Krippner, David Luke, Julia
Mossbridge, Chris Roe, Gary Schwartz, Christine
Simmonds-Moore, Mário Simöes, Lance Storm,
Harald Walach, and of course Etzel Cardeña.
Relative to these, the metaphysical solution
advocated by Cunninghman and Taylor appears
to be an outlier, one that is much more congruent
with the characteristics of a New Age religion
(Hanegraaff, 1996; Hartelius, 2017b).
What is the Shape of a Psychological Science
Based in Open Naturalism?
aturalism is the philosophical result of eliminating
supernaturalism (Papineau, 2021), the notion
that there are aspects of existence belonging to a
radically different and superior reality—typically
divine or spiritual in nature. With conventional
Western naturalism, the key issue for psychology
is its logical tendency to reduce consciousness
and mental phenomena to nothing more than the
measurable physical events with which they are
associated. This is problematic for a number of
reasons, such as the fact that the philosophy and
science that leads to such conclusions exist only
in people (cf. Rogers, 1955), and if the fruits of a
human endeavor appear to invalidate the reality
of those who undertake it, then it seems fitting to
recognize the process as self-negating rather than
submit to its conclusions. Cardeña (2014, 2018)
has moreover offered an empirical case against
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reductive elimination of consciousness-related
phenomena.
Whether or not mind and consciousness
exist distinguishably from the biochemical processes
with which they are associated is a question about
background reality that cannot be bracketed in the
same way as metaphysical beliefs associated with
religion: either mind and consciousness have some
actual existence per se, or they do not—and both
conclusions are metaphysical because thethere is no
current prospect that the nature of these foundational
aspects of human experience can be investigated
empirically. When the scientific subject is polymer
chemistry or thermodynamics, the default scientific
assumption that negates mentality is of minor
consequence; when the subject is psychology, the
impact is profound.
However, if a psychology seeks to counter
this impact by positively affirming the primacy of
consciousness (e.g., Beauregard, 2014), or of lived
experience (Robbins, 2016), it is simply committing
itself to an alternate metaphysical position. Since
scientific psychology sees its typical denial of
consciousness as a disbelief in metaphysics, rather
than recognizing it as a metaphysical disbelief—
that is, a rejection based on metaphysical criteria
rather than empirical evidence (Hartelius, 2019)—
psychological affirmation of consciousness is merely
an alternate metaphysics. Although I have expressed
a personal opinion favoring alternate metaphysics
of this sort and agreed with others espousing such
views (Hartelius, 2013, 2016a), I have come to
appreciate that such an assertion is little more fruitful
than disagreeing over how many angels can dance
on the head of a pin.
Since any answer to the question of
consciousness is metaphysical, a preferable strategy
for transpersonal psychology may be to bracket the
question, and embrace a metaphysical agnosticism
(Ferrer, 2014). This effectively rejects the erasure of
mind and consciousness (cf. Cardeña, 2014), and
increases the neutrality of scientific psychology.
Consciousness-related research can thereby proceed
in a variety of directions without commitment to a
particular metaphysics that either favors or excludes
consciousness; it will then be empirical results, not
philosophy, that determines whether a particular line

of research is fruitful. An open naturalism that does not
prejudge the nature of what is actually so has in fact
been explicitly endorsed by a former President of the
American Psychological Association (Stroud, 2004).
Philosophically, an open naturalism can be
justified by one of any number of strategies including
non-reductive physicalism (e.g., Strawson, 2006),
dual aspect monism (e.g., Benovsky 2016), and
intersubjective approaches such as participatory
thought (e.g., Ferrer, 2002, 2014, 2017; Ferrer &
Sherman, 2008; Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013). I have
argued that science would be more scientific if its
specifically Western reality assumptions are denied
veto power over what constitutes evidence (Hartelius,
2014a), over how diversities will be adequately
reflected (Hartelius, 2014b), and in defining what is
possible (and what is an “exceptional claim”) for the
person and the human mind (Hartelius, 2019).
Describing the problem that bedevils
researchers, scholars, and readers who hold a more
expansive view of science (and of consciousness),
and even naming a solution, is simpler than giving
shape and form to that solution. Whether or not the
solution comes under the banner of “naturalism” or
“materialism” or “consciousness” may matter less than
whether it allows for the world to disclose itself to us,
empirically, rather than placing a priori restraints on
what is real or possible (cf. Ferrer, 2014; Stroud, 2004), or
constructing gratuitous metaphysical embellishments
(Daniels, 2022; Ferrer, 2002; Friedman, 2021). The
more pragmatic question concerns how transpersonal
will participate in cultivating a psychology of the
whole person, and of all persons (Hartelius, 2019).
It may be too early to articulate in detail what
a scientific transpersonal psychology would look like
if it were based explicitly in a more open naturalism.
Such a field would certainly work to identify
and measure experiences valued as beneficial
by cultures or by numerous individuals, but that
are marginalized or dismissed by conventional
psychology. While research results would not be
limited by conventional Western reality assumptions,
an open scientific naturalism would not advance or
accept metaphysical explanations. This rather logical
consequence follows from the fact that research
results are interpreted based on evidence, which by
definition excludes metaphysics. By the same token,
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if direct evidence is found for some phenomenon
previously believed to be metaphysical, and that
evidence is subsequently validated, then by definition
that phenomenon is no longer metaphysical.
As progress is made in efforts to carefully
measure subtle and elusive beneficial experiences
and capacities in ways that maintain the integrity of
those phenomena, a time will come when enough
has been achieved that a better description of such
a psychology will become possible. Meanwhile, a
review of the transpersonal field’s empirical literature
to date may provide some indications of what
lies ahead. Key areas for future focus will include
furthering the development of methods and tools
that expand the current limits and boundaries of
empirical measurement and observation of the types
of phenomena that transpersonal psychology has
considered (cf. Ferrer, 2014; Friedman & Hartelius,
2021), and that strive to advance the measurement of
states of consciousness (e.g., Hartelius, 2020; Hartelius
et al., 2022). Given that the transpersonal field has
always positioned itself as expansive and exploratory,
these areas of development would not exclude
ongoing work in philosophy and hermeneutics,
discussion of metaphysical issues, or even attempts
to reverse-engineer metaphysical accounts back to
associated phenomenal experiences and measurable
cognitive mechanisms or neural correlates (e.g.,
Lancaster, 2004).
A Transpersonal Psychology
Based in Open Scientific Naturalism
he stakes are whether or not psychology will
evolve into a field that can serve the diversities
of an emerging world no longer content to aspire
to Western beliefs and values. Not every society
reaching for technological modernity wishes to
leave behind its spirituality or its cultural relationship
with dreams or trance or other exceptional
states and capacities. Even Western societies are
experiencing fundamentalist backlashes against
stark modernist values. Through embrace of an
open scientific naturalism, transpersonal psychology
has the opportunity to leave behind its sometimes
anti-scientific impulses and participate in the
development of the broader field of psychology
(cf. Wade, 2019) as it opens and adapts to serve
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the array of human temperaments, identities, and
cultures that are the real world.
Transpersonal psychology began as a
scientific field pushing against the limitations of
the background philosophy implicit in scientific
society—a narrow version of materialism rooted
in specifically Western culture that marginalizes or
pathologizes the very types of human experiences
and capacities that have been much of the field’s
focus. In its early years, papers published in JTP
were largely consistent with a science feeling its
way toward a more open naturalism—one that
welcomed empirical research into a biologically
rooted "higher-nature-of-man" (Maslow, as quoted
in Sutich, 1976, p. 11). Transpersonal psychology
has attended especially to exceptional human
experiences (e.g., Sutich, 1969), along with the
implications these have for defining the person
(Hartelius et al., 2021) and for the shaping of human
psychology more broadly (Hartelius, 2016b).
Gradual expansion of this impulse toward
an empirical scientific discipline based in open
naturalism is reflected in the slow but steady
increase in the field’s empirical literature, especially
since the early 2000s (Hartelius, 2021), as well as
developments in theoretical and philosophical
discourse. While philosophical questions about
metaphysics and the nature of reality will and should
continue, the urgencies of human suffering and
trauma that run far deeper and wider than stories
that reach news headlines, demand that whatever
the transpersonal field has to offer psychology be
brought forward in the form of practical empirical
research as rapidly and as effectively as possible.
In This Issue
his Special Topic Section, focused on Empirical
Research in Transpersonal Psychology, begins with
a paper by Tadas Stumbrys entitled, The Luminous
Night of the Soul: The Relationship Between Lucid
Dreaming and Spirituality. The study examines the
relationship between spirituality and this experience
in which a dreamer is aware that they are dreaming.
Without implying a causal link, the study found
significant positive association between lucid dream
frequency and reported spiritual transcendence—a
tantalizing link that deserves further study.
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A second study, by Miran Lavric, Snezana
Brumec, and Andrej Naterer, focuses on Exceptional
Human Experiences Among Pilgrims on the Camino
de Santiago: A Study of Self-Reported Experiences
and Transformative Aftereffects. His online survey of
over 500 pilgrims found strong correlations between
exceptional experiences while walking the Camino
and transformative aftereffects such as enhanced
self-confidence and improved relationships. This
suggests that practices such as walking pilgrimages
can produce lasting positive psychosocial effects.
A research paper by Sonia Romero Martinez,
Andrés Dueñas, and Xavier Ordoñes, reports on
Effects of Brief Daily Kundalini Yoga Meditation on
Self-Esteem, Mood and Emotional Self-Efficacy: A
Randomized Comparison Study. Spanish-speaking
adults in Spain reported that a short engagement
with either of two types of kundalini yoga meditation
from the Yogi Bhajan Lineage had positive impacts
on multiple dimensions of life.
In the section’s final paper, Samuel W. Root
provides direction on Using LEGOs® in Research
Facilitation: An Advanced Scripted Research
Method. This six-step process requires 30 to 60
minutes, and is designed for use in situations such as
overcoming impasses in the research process. The
method can also be adapted for use in play therapy.
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